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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ELEVENTH AMENDMENT - SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY - FEDERALISM - The United States Supreme Court held
that congressional powers pursuant to Article I of the United
States Constitution cannot be relied upon to evade constitutional
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction by the Eleventh
Amendment as the Amendment restricts judicial power under
Article III.
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996)
In September of 1991, the Seminole Tribe of Indians (the
"Tribe") sued the state of Florida ("Florida") and its governor
alleging that Florida had refused to negotiate conditions that
would allow the Tribe to conduct certain gaming or gambling
activities on the Seminole reservation as required by the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"). 1 In particular, the Tribe
claimed that Florida violated the good faith negotiation require-
ment found in section 2710(d)(3) of the IGRA.2 Florida moved to
1. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1121 (1996). The Tribe
wished to negotiate the inclusion of certain casino-type gambling activities and slot
machines into a tribal-state compact. Respondent's Brief at 4, Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994) (No. 94-12). Congress passed the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act ("IGRA") pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST., art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3, for the stated purpose of "provid[ing] a statutory basis for the operation of gam-
ing by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self suffi-
ciency, and strong tribal governments." 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (1988). The regulations
embodied in the IGRA divide gaming into three classes and provide a different regulatory
scheme for each class. See id. § 2703(6-8). Class I gaming encompasses social games
played solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in
by individuals as part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations. Id.
§ 2703(6). Class II gaming includes bingo, games similar to bingo, nonbanking card
games not illegal under the laws of the state and card games operated in particular states
prior to the passage of the IGRA. Id. § 2703(7). Class III games are the primary focus of
most litigation, as i]t is the most heavily regulated of the three classes." Seminole, 116
S. Ct. at 1120. Class III gaming, which includes slots, banking games, parimutuel racing
(e.g., horse racing) and lotteries, can be conducted by a tribe only when the regulatory
scheme set forth in the IGRA is satisfied. Id. The IGRA provides that Class III gaming is
lawful only when it is conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into
by the Indian tribe and the state. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) (1988).
2. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1120. This section of the IGRA provides:
Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over Indian lands upon which a Class
III gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall request the State
in which such lands are located to enter into a Tribal-State compact governing the
conduct of gaming activities. Upon receiving such a request, the state shall negoti-
ate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact.
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dismiss the complaint on the basis that the action violated the
state's sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. On June
18, 1992, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida denied the motion and Florida commenced an
interlocutory appeal of the decision.4 Immediate appellate
review was granted based on the collateral order doctrine.5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the decision of the district court and held that the Elev-
enth Amendment barred the Tribe's suit against Florida.
Although the circuit court agreed with the district court's conclu-
sion that Congress intended to abrogate states' sovereign immu-
nity under the IGRA, and that it passed the IGRA pursuant to
congressional power under the Indian Commerce Clause,7 the
circuit court disagreed with the district court's finding that the
Indian Commerce Clause granted Congress the power to abro-
gate states' sovereign immunity from suit.' The circuit court
then determined that as a result of Florida's sovereign immu-
nity, it had no jurisdiction over the Tribe's pending suit.9 Impor-
tantly, the court also held that the doctrine of Ex parte Young, °
which would have permitted suit against the governor of Florida,
was not available to the Tribe for use in forcing good faith negoti-
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1988).
3. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1121. Florida based its dismissal request on the Elev-
enth Amendment, which provides, in relevant part: "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See Respondent's Brief at 4,
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994) (No.94-12).
4. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1020 (11th Cir. 1994). An
interlocutory appeal is "an appeal of a matter which is not determinable of the contro-
versy, but which is necessary for a suitable adjudication of the merits." BLACiKs LAw
DICTIONARY 815 (6th ed. 1990).
5. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1021. See also Griesel v. Hamlin, 963 F.2d 338, 340 (11th
Cir. 1992). The collateral order doctrine allows immediate appellate review of any order
denying claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer
Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993).
6. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1016.
7. The Indian Commerce Clause is found in the United States Constitution, Arti-
cle I, Section 8, clause 3, and provides: "Congress shall have Power... To regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Abrogation is defined as: "[tihe destruction or annulling of a
former law, by act of the legislative power." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 8 (6th ed. 1990).
Abrogation in this context means a revocation of the immunity granted to states by the
Eleventh Amendment, thereby making the states amendable to suit without their
consent.
8. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1019.
9. Id. at 1029.
10. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Ex parte Young doctrine allows a suit to go forward
notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar where the suit seeks pro-
spective injunctive relief in order to end a continuing violation of federal law. See id.
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ations." In conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case
to the district court with direction to dismiss the Tribe's suit for
want of subject matter jurisdiction. 2
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
case to address two questions. 3 First, the Court considered
whether the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from
authorizing suits by Indian tribes against states for prospective
injunctive relief to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause. 14  Second, the Court examined
whether the doctrine of Ex Parte Young permits suits against
state governors for prospective injunctive relief to enforce the
good faith bargaining requirement of the IGRA.'5
The Court began its analysis by stating that while the Elev-
enth Amendment appears to restrict only the federal courts' Arti-
cle III diversity jurisdiction, the Amendment has been broadly
interpreted to encompass not only its literal meaning but also
the propositions that it reinforces. 16 The Court then restated
these propositions to be, as initially set forth in Hans v. Louisi-
ana, 17 that: (1) each state is a sovereign entity in the federal sys-
tem; and (2) it is inherent in the nature of a sovereign not to be
amenable to suit brought against it by an individual without its
consent.'8 The Seminole Court then noted that for over one hun-
dred years following Hans, the notion that federal jurisdiction
over suits against unconsenting states "was not contemplated by
11. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1028-29.
12. Id. at 1029. Subject matter jurisdiction "refers to a court's power to hear and
determine cases of the general class or category to which proceedings in question belong."
BLACies LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (6th ed. 1990).
13. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122. Certiorari is a writ used by the Supreme Court as
a discretionary device in choosing the cases it wishes to hear. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY
228 (6th ed. 1990).
14. Id.
15. Id. While the interlocutory appeal was pending before the Eleventh Circuit,
the district court granted Florida's earlier filed summary judgment motion and found
that Florida had fulfilled its obligation under the IGRA to negotiate in good faith. Id. A
summary judgment may be granted when there is no disputed issue as to the material
facts of the case, or if only a question of law is involved. BLAcies LAw DICTIONARY 1435
(6th ed. 1990). The Eleventh Circuit stayed its review of the summary judgment decision
pending the disposition of the present case. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122.
16. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,
501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (holding that states, by entering into the Constitution, did not
consent to suit by Indian tribes)).
17. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
18. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122. In Hans, the Court quoted Thx FEDERALIST No.
81, written by Alexander Hamilton, and posited that the passage stands for the proposi-
tion that Article III was not intended to confer the power to sue sovereign states on indi-
viduals when written. Hans, 134 U.S. at 13.
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the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States" was reaffirmed.
19
The Seminole Tribe did not dispute the fact that Florida had
not consented to the suit.20 Rather, the Tribe argued that its suit
was not barred by state sovereign immunity because Congress
had abrogated the immunity through the IGRA.21 The Tribe also
argued that its suit should be allowed to proceed against the gov-
ernor of Florida under the doctrine of Ex parte Young.22
The Court used a two-step process to determine whether Con-
gress had abrogated Florida's sovereign immunity under the
IGRA.23 First, pursuant to Green v. Mansour,24 the Court ascer-
tained whether Congress had clearly expressed an intent to abro-
gate states' sovereign immunity within the IGRA.28 Second, if
Congress did express such an intent, the Court determined
whether such abrogation was a constitutionally valid exercise of
congressional power.26
Under the first step of the analysis, the Court agreed with the
Eleventh Circuit's finding that Congress indeed intended to abro-
gate states' sovereign immunity under the IGRA by providing an
"unmistakably clear" statement of this intent within the Act.27
Furthermore, the Court found that the remedial provisions of the
IGRA left no doubt that states were to be the parties against
whom remedies under the Act were to be sought.28 After then
reviewing the numerous references to the word "state" in the text
of the IGRA, the Court concluded that Congress intended to
abrogate states' sovereign immunity from suit.
29
The Court next considered whether the action taken by Con-
gress constituted a valid exercise of its constitutional power.3 0
The Tribe had argued that since the IGRA only sanctioned pro-
19. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122.
20. Id.
21. Petitioner's Brief at 15, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th
Cir. 1994) (No. 94-12).
22. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1123.
23. Id.
24. 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (holding that absent continuing violation of federal law,
Eleventh Amendment limitation on Article III jurisdiction prevents federal courts from
ordering "notice relief" or declaratory judgments based on prior conduct of state officials).
25. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1124.
26. Id. at 1123.
27. Id. at 1124. See 25 U.S.C § 2710(d)(7) (1988). In a series of cases beginning
with Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-39 (1985), the Court formu-
lated a special "clear statement rule" to determine whether specific Acts of Congress con-
tained an effective exercise of the power to create a private federal cause of action against
a state. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1134.
28. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1124. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (1988).
29. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1123.
30. Id. at 1124.
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spective injunctive relief rather than retroactive monetary dam-
ages, the Court should find the abrogation of immunity to be a
valid exercise of congressional power.3 ' The Court responded to
this argument by noting that determining whether the Eleventh
Amendment bars a suit by determining whether a party to the
suit could receive a monetary judgment would be a curious
approach. 2 Consequently, the Court concluded that the type of
relief sought is irrelevant to whether Congress has the power to
abrogate states' immunity.33
The Tribe then argued that since the federal government
granted to the states via the IGRA a power that the states did
not formerly have, the abrogation power was validly exercised.34
The Court also rejected this argument, finding that Congress
may not unilaterally set aside Eleventh Amendment immunity
with a grant of some other legislatively created authority.35 The
Court subsequently focused its inquiry on whether Congress had
passed the IGRA on the basis of a constitutional provision grant-
ing Congress the power of abrogation.36
The Court had previously found congressional power to abro-
gate constitutionally valid in only two instances.37 In Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer,s the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
extended federal power to intrude upon the province of the Elev-
enth Amendment.39 In particular, the Court found that Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to abrogate the
states' immunity from suit otherwise guaranteed by the Elev-
31. Id.
32. Id. The Court quoted Corey v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982), which provided
that "it would be a novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a
suit to enjoin the State itself simply because no monetary judgment is sought." Id.
33. Id. (citing Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 115 S. Ct. 394,
404 (1994Xholding that "the Eleventh Amendment does not exist solely in order to
preven[t] federal court judgments that must be paid out of a state's treasury")).
34. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1124. The Tribe was referring to the transfer of author-
ity over gaming on Indian lands to the states as granted under the IGRA. Id.
35. Id. The Court agreed that "[iut is true enough that the [IGRA] extends to the
states a power withheld from them by the Constitution." Id. at 1124 (citing California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S 202 (1987) (holding state could not enforce its
civil regulatory gaming laws on Indian lands)). The Court concluded, however, that the
supplemental grant of authority was irrelevant to a determination of whether Congress
possesses the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Id. at 1125.
36. Id. at 1125. The Court simply asked whether "the Act in question was passed
pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate." Id.
37. Id.
38. 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976).
39. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455. The Court found that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment expanded federal power at the expense of state autonomy and shifted the balance of
state and federal power set by the Constitution. Id. at 456.
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enth Amendment.' In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,41 the
Court upheld congressional abrogation of a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity under the Interstate Commerce Clause.42
The Court based the Union Gas decision upon the rationale that
congressional regulatory power over interstate commerce would
be incomplete without the authority to hold states liable for
damages.4
In Seminole, the Tribe argued that while Congress passed the
IGRA pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause rather than the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Interstate Commerce Clause, this
distinction was inconsequential as the power to abrogate under
the Indian Commerce Clause was no less than the power con-
ferred under the Interstate Commerce Clause.44 To support this
assertion, the Tribe contended that the Union Gas plurality
found the power to abrogate to be located in the plenary charac-
ter of the grant of authority to Congress to regulate interstate
commerce, which still leaves the states with some power to regu-
late themselves.45 Since congressional power to regulate under
the Indian Commerce Clause is even more complete, as regula-
tion of Indian affairs remains exclusively in the hands of the fed-
eral government, the Tribe reasoned that Congress' power to
abrogate under the IGRA was more likely to be present.4
In response, Florida argued that since Congress' authority
over Indian Tribes is complete, the power to abrogate is not nec-
essary to affirm the rightful exercise of congressional authority
in that area.47 Florida attempted to distinguish the Interstate
Commerce Clause from the Indian Commerce Clause by assert-
40. Id. at 456. The Fitzpatrick Court described this circumstance as "carving out"
of state authority a power that was then passed to the federal government. Id.
41. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
42. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-20. The Interstate Commerce Clause, located in the
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, clause 3, provides: "Congress shall have
Power ... To Regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
43. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-20. Justice White added the fifth vote for the plural-
ity but wrote separately to express his disagreement with much of the plurality's ration-
ale. Id. at 57.
44. Petitioner's Brief at 17, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th
Cir. 1994) (No. 94-12).
45. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1125.
46. Petitioner's Brief at 20, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th
Cir. 1994) (No. 94-12). The Tribe also argued that the power of abrogation under the
Indian Commerce Clause is necessary for the protection of tribes from state action deny-
ing federally guaranteed rights. Id. The Tribe noted: "Because of the local ill feeling, the
people of the states where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their
very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealings with the Federal
Government... there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power." Id.
47. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1126.
Vol. 35:741746
Recent Decisions
ing that the Interstate Commerce Clause does not involve a com-
plete transfer of authority to the federal government, and,
therefore, the abrogation power is necessary to accomplish the
goals of Congress via the Interstate Commerce Clause. Florida
then argued that the Indian Commerce Clause, in contrast, com-
pletely transfers authority to the federal government and ren-
ders the power of abrogation unnecessary.4'
The Court acknowledged both parties reliance upon the hold-
ing in Union Gas and commenced its opinion with an analysis of
that case.49 The Court considered whether the Indian Commerce
Clause, like the Interstate Commerce Clause in Union Gas, con-
stitutes a grant of authority to the federal government at the
expense of the states. ° Under the Union Gas rationale, the
Court observed that if a state's partial relinquishment of control
over a particular area includes a surrender of immunity from
suit, then a state's total abdication of authority over a different
area must also include a surrender of immunity from suit.51 The
Court then accepted the Tribe's position that Union Gas allows
no distinction to be drawn between the Indian Commerce Clause
and the Interstate Commerce Clause.52
The Court next stated, however, that it was not bound by the
principle of stare decisis.3 in the matter before it, and further
stated that it was not constrained to follow precedent when deci-
sions were impractical or illogically reasoned.14 Subsequently,
the Court overruled Union Gas. 
55
The Court stated that at the time Union Gas was decided, it
was well established that the Eleventh Amendment represented
the constitutional principle that state sovereign immunity lim-
48. Respondent's Brief at 8-9, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016
(11th Cir. 1994) (No. 94-12).
49. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1126.
50. Id. The Court stated, "if anything, the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes
a greater transfer of power from the States to the federal government than does the Inter-
state Commerce Clause." Id.
51. Id. The Court acknowledged Justice Scalia's dissenting conclusion in Union
Gas: [i]f the Article I commerce power enables abrogation of state sovereign immunity,
so do all the Article I powers." Id. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1127.
53. Stare decisis is a prudential restraint imposed by the courts requiring courts to
adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are established. See BLAcK's LAw
DIcTIoNARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
54. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1127. The Court found that avoiding strict adherence to
precedent is especially necessary in constitutional cases since in such cases correction
through legislative action is practically impossible. Id. Interestingly, the creation of the
Eleventh Amendment stemmed from 'legislative correction' of the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934).
55. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
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ited the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article 111.56 The Court
then noted that Union Gas had been the only decision that
expanded federal court jurisdiction beyond the bounds of Article
III, contrary to the century old doctrine established in Hans v.
Louisiana .57
The Court concluded that when deciding whether Congress
had the power to abrogate states' sovereign immunity under the
Indian Commerce Clause, it is required to proceed with fidelity to
the Hans doctrine.58 The Seminole majority noted that the Hans
decision was not grounded solely on English common law as had
been characterized by the dissenting opinion in Seminole, but
rather on the more fundamental "jurisprudence of all civilized
nations." 9 The Seminole majority also found that the principle
of state sovereign immunity is differentiated from other common
law principles, as only sovereign immunity initiates the passage
of a specific constitutional amendment.6 0 Finally, the Seminole
majority held that Article I powers cannot be relied upon to
evade the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdic-
tion by the Eleventh Amendment, as the Eleventh Amendment
restricts the judicial power under Article 111.61
The Court then turned to the second inquiry in the case and
noted that the doctrine of Ex parte Young allows a suit barred by
the Eleventh Amendment to proceed in order to prevent a contin-
uing violation of federal law by a state official.62 Looking at the
facts of Seminole, the Court noted that the alleged continuing
56. Id. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), the Court determined that the
Constitution does not prohibit suits against staItes; and this determination led to the pas-
sage of the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 1129. While the Eleventh Amendment does not
specifically restrict federal question jurisdiction under Article III, it was held to do so in
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The dissent in Union Gas argued that under the
plurality's conclusion in Union Gas, Congress could, under Article I, expand the scope of
the federal courts'jurisdiction under Article III pursuant to Article I powers. Union Gas,
491 U.S. at 40 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Such a conclusion, argued the Union Gas dissent,
contradicts the Court's long-standing principle that Article III sets forth the exclusive
catalog of permissible federal court jurisdiction. Id. at 40.
57. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1128. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 1.
58. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1128. The Hans doctrine expanded the scope of Elev-
enth Amendment, establishing the constitutional principle that state sovereign immunity
limits the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III. Id. at 1127.
59. Id. at 1129. The Court quoted Hans, where Chief Justice Taney stated: "It is
an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that a sovereign cannot
be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission .. ." Id.
(quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 17).
60. Id. at 1130. The Court was responding to the dissent's proposition that the
common law principle of sovereign immunity is open to change by the legislature, thereby
refuting the constitutional basis of sovereign immunity. Id.
61. Id. at 1131.




violation of federal law was the Florida governor's refusal to
negotiate Indian gaming rights. 3 The Court then responded to
this allegation by asserting that it would not augment a remedial
scheme designed by Congress such as that outlined in the IGRA
with one of judicial creation, particularly when Congress pro-
vided that the scheme would be the sole remedy available for the
enforcement of a particular federal right.6' The Court further
expressed a desire to proceed with caution before discarding a
particularized remedial scheme designed by Congress for viola-
tions of a statutorily created right.
65
The Court found the IGRA's good faith provisions to indeed be
the remedial scheme available to a Tribe when a state fails to
fulfill its obligations under the IGRA.6 6 The Court then con-
cluded that an Ex parte Young injunction against a state official
would unduly expand the remedies available to a tribe in the
event of such a violation.67 The Court also found that allowing
an action to proceed under Ex parte Young would expose state
officials to the full remedial powers of a federal court, thus ren-
dering section 2710(d)(7) of the IGRA superfluous.
68
Additionally, the Court reasoned that if it allowed an Ex parte
Young injunction to issue in this circumstance, tribes would no
longer seek redress through the less effective and more complex
IGRA mechanism.6 9 The Court thus declined to rewrite the
remedial scheme of the IGRA. Further, the Court refused to
speculate as to what Congress may have intended had Congress
63. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1132.
64. Id. The Court noted that "[wihen the design of a Government program sug-
gests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for
constitutional violations which may occur in the course of its administration, we have not
created additional remedies." Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. The majority stated: "Congress intended... not only to define, but also
significantly to limit, the duty imposed by § 2710(d)(3)." Id. Section 2710(d)(3)(A)
provides:
Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which a
Class III gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall request the
State in which such lands are located to enter into negotiations for the purpose of
entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities.
Upon receiving such a request, the State shall negotiate with the Indian Tribe in
good faith to enter into such a compact.
25 U.S.C. § 2710(dX3)(A) (1988).
67. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1132.
68. Id. at 1133.
69. Id. The Court also considered the extent of the remedies available to tribes
under an Ex parte Young action, concluding that this remedy would expose the state offi-
cial to the full remedial powers of the federal courts, including contempt sanctions. Id.
1997 749
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known that it lacked the authority to make states amendable to
suit under the IGRA.7 °
The Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits
Congress from granting jurisdiction to federal courts for the pur-
pose of enforcing federal statutory rights against the states.
71
The Court further held that the Ex parte Young exception to
Eleventh Amendment immunity cannot be used to enforce sec-
tion 2710(d)(3) of the IGRA.72 In effect, therefore, the Court
affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's dismissal of the Tribe's suit.
73
The Eleventh Amendment was the first amendment added to
the Constitution for the purpose of overturning a Supreme Court
decision.74 In Chisholm v. Georgia,75 a South Carolina citizen
sued the state of Georgia in a common law assumpsit action to
collect a debt.76 The Chisholm court concluded that Article III of
the United States Constitution extended the judicial power of the
federal government to encompass suits against a state by citi-
zens of another state.77
In a 4-1 decision, the court in Chisholm found that state
immunity existing prior to ratification of the Constitution was
abrogated for purposes of federal jurisdiction involving state-citi-
zen diversity.78 The court further determined that it made no
difference whether the state was the plaintiff or defendant to the
suit and thus rejected the view that Article III jurisdiction lies
only in state-instituted actions.79 Georgia was therefore held
subject to the judicial power of the federal court.80
70. Id. The Court concluded that if the statutory scheme needed to be corrected,
the effort should be made by Congress and not the federal courts. Id.
71. Id.
72. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133. The Court stated that Congress imposed more
limited liability upon a state under IGRA's remedial scheme indicating that Congress had
no desire to expand the liability that would result under the Ex parte Young doctrine. Id.
73. Id.
74. Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, The Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YAE L. J. 1 (1988).
75. 2 Dall. 419 (1793).
76. Chisholm, 2 Dall. at 421. Chisholm sought payment for goods purchased by
the state of Georgia during the revolutionary war. Id. Assumpsit is a common law form
of action that lies for the recovery of damages for the non-performance of a parol or simple
contract or a contract that is neither of record or under seal. BLAcK's LAw DICTONARY
122 (6th ed. 1990).
77. Chisholm, 2 Dall. at 426. Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitu-
tion provides in pertinent part: "The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their authority." U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
78. Chisholm, 2 Dall. at 426.
79. Id. at 420-21.
80. Id. at 479. In response to the Chisholm holding, "proposed amendments were
offered, and within a year, Congress had passed the Eleventh Amendment." Jackson,
supra note 74 at 8. Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion in Seminole, attacked the
750 Vol. 35:741
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In Hans v. Louisiana,8 1 the United States Supreme Court con-
fronted the issue of whether the Eleventh Amendment barred a
suit against a state by one of the state's own citizens.8 2 A citizen
of Louisiana brought a suit against the state of Louisiana for
recovery of interest due on a bond issue that Louisiana
attempted to repudiate.1s Louisiana argued that the federal
court lacked jurisdiction over the case.8 ' Hans argued in
response that the Eleventh Amendment was no barrier to federal
jurisdiction since he was a citizen of the state he was suing. 5
The Court agreed that a literal reading of the Eleventh
Amendment only prohibits suits against a state brought by citi-
zens of another state or by foreign subjects.8 The Court did not,
however, accept the proposition that upon passage of the Elev-
enth Amendment, there was an implicit validation of a citizen's
right to sue his/her home state; rather, the Court found that such
a reading "strained the Constitution and the law to a construc-
tion never dreamed of."
8 7
The Hans Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment bars
federal question jurisdiction raised by individuals who are citi-
zens of the state they are suing. 8 The Court read the Eleventh
Amendment as to not only reverse the decision of the Chisholm
court, but also interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to require
courts to construe Article III jurisdiction so as not to create reme-
dies that would have been unavailable prior to the passage of the
Constitution.8 9 The Hans court conceded that while the literal
Seminole majority's reliance on the statement that Chisholm "created such a shock of
surprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Seminole,
116 S. Ct. at 1130 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Principality of Monaco, 292 U.S. at
313). Justice Souter pointed to the fact that it was two years after Chisholm before the
Eleventh Amendment was ratified. Id. at 1148.
81. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
82. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.
83. Id. at 3. The issue raised a federal question since Hans argued that the state
had impaired the obligation of contracts, forbidden by Article I, Section 10 of the United
States Constitution. Id.
84. Id. Louisiana's position was that absent consent, "the Constitution and laws
do not give this Honorable Court jurisdiction of a suit against the state" and its jurisdic-
tion was respectfully declined. Hans, 134 U.S. at 3.
85. Id. at 10. Hans argued that the Eleventh Amendment restricts jurisdiction in
cases involving diversity alone, not those involving a federal question. Id.
86. Id.
87. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15. The Court reasoned that if Hans' argument was
accepted, an anomalous result would occur because a state could be sued by its own citi-
zens in federal question cases but not by the citizens of another state on the same cause of
action. Id. at 10.
88. Id. at 21.
89. Id. at 11. The Hans Court stated, "it was not the intention to create new and




language of the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit suits by
citizens against their home state, the Amendment does prohibit
the Constitution from being construed as importing any power to
authorize maintenance of such suits.90
For more than a century following Hans, the Court grounded
decisions involving Article III jurisdiction on the understanding
that state sovereign immunity is a fundamental part of the Elev-
enth Amendment.9 ' As a result of the broad construction given
to the principle of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment following Hans, the doctrine of Ex parte Young
developed. 2 Under this doctrine, the Court regarded an action
against a state officer to be distinguishable from a suit against
the state in certain instances, and therefore did not find the Elev-
enth Amendment to be an obstacle to such a suit.
9 3
In Ex parte Young,94 the Court decided a case that was
prompted by an effort to prevent Minnesota from instituting rate
regulation of railway companies. 9 A group of stockholders sued
the Attorney General of Minnesota in federal court, claiming
that continued enforcement of a Minnesota state law setting rail-
road rates violated their constitutional rights to equal protection
and due process.96 In response to the claim, the court directed
the Minnesota Attorney General to cease enforcement of Minne-
sota's railroad rate regulations.9 v The Attorney General then
petitioned the Supreme Court for release from the injunction9
8
and argued that the suit was, in effect, a suit against the state of
Minnesota.9 The Supreme Court rejected the Attorney Gen-
eral's arguments, and held that state officials who attempt to
enforce unconstitutional laws may be enjoined from doing so by
federal courts.1 0°
90. Id.
91. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1129.
92. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1028. The Supreme Court developed this exception to
sovereign immunity by finding that the Eleventh Amendment does not always provide
immunity to government officials. Id.
93. Id. This "fiction" permits an individual to obtain injunctive relief against the
state officer who commits a violation of federal law. Id.
94. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
95. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 129.
96. Id. at 131. The Minnesota legislature passed an act reducing railroad passen-
ger rates from three cents to two cents per mile and established rates for the transporta-
tion of certain commodities. Id at 127.
97. Id. at 132.
98. Id. at 132-33. The Attorney General claimed that (1) the circuit court had no
jurisdiction over him in his official capacity, and (2) the suit by the stockholders violated
the Eleventh Amendment as neither he nor the state had consented to the suit. Id.
99. Id. at 132.
100. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 156.
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In addition to the protection afforded individual parties by the
Ex parte Young doctrine, several other avenues remained avail-
able for overcoming the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar
following Hans.'10 For example, a general understanding pre-
vailed that Congress retains the power to create federal causes of
action against a state for violations of federal law. 10 2 Further,
Congress maintains the ability to override immunity when it acts
pursuant to congressional powers grounded in the Constitution,
albeit only in restricted instances where Congress makes its
intent to do so "unmistakably clear."10 3
The Supreme Court first set forth the "clear statement" rule in
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.10 In Atascadero, the issue
was whether California was subject to suit in federal court by
individuals seeking redress for violations of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.105 Recognizing the Eleventh Amendment's position
in the crucial balance between the federal government and the
states, the Atascadero Court concluded that Congress can abro-
gate a state's constitutionally secured immunity only when it
makes its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language
of a statute.0 6 The Atascadero Court then held that the general
language authorizing suit in the Rehabilitation Act is not specific
enough to subject a state to suit against it brought by its own
citizens. Subsequently, the Court dismissed the action brought
by the California citizens against California. 107
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,0 8 current and retired male employees
of the state of Connecticut sued Connecticut alleging that the
state's retirement plan was discriminatory in violation of Title
101. Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1021. In addition to an Exparte Young injunction, sover-
eign immunity could be relinquished by consent and abrogation. Id.
102. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted
that the "clear statement' cases would have been unintelligible if Hans had established
that Congress lacked the constitutional power to make states amenable to suit in federal
courts no matter how clear its intention to do so. Id. at 1139.
103. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 6 (citing Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234 (1985).
104. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
105. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 240. Douglas Scanlon sued Atascadero State Hospital,
alleging that the hospital denied him employment because of his physical handicaps. Id.
at 236. Mr. Scanlon charged that the hospital's refusal to hire him violated the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973. Id. Section 794 of the Act prohibits discrimination by any program or
facility receiving federal funds. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
106. Id. at 242.
107. Id. at 246. In addition to the "clear statement" requirement, the Court also
stated that Congress must be acting pursuant to a bona fide exercise of authority before a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity may be overridden. See Green v. Mansour, 474
U.S. 64 (1985).
108. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.109 The issue in Fitzpatrick
was whether Acts of Congress passed pursuant to the Four-
teenth Amendment abrogate Eleventh Amendment protection of
state sovereign immunity. 10
The Fitzpatrick Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
embodiment of state sovereign immunity is limited by the
enforcement provisions of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."' The Court reasoned that Congress has the power to pro-
vide for private causes of action against a state to enforce
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment because congressional
intrusions into the autonomy previously reserved to the states,
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, were sanctioned by the
Framers and incorporated into the Constitution upon passage of
the Civil War Amendments."
12
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company13 marked the only other
decision in which the Supreme Court found constitutional
authority for congressional abrogation of a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 4 In Union Gas, the Court concluded
that Congress had the authority to assess monetary recoveries
against states in federal courts when legislating under the Inter-
state Commerce Clause." 5 In a plurality decision," 6 the Court
found that the Comprehensive Environmental Response Com-
pensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA)" 17 permitted
109. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, passed pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, authorizes suits against state governments that
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(a) (1970 and Supp. IV).
110. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448.
111. Id. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall
have the power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S.
CONST. amend XIV, § 5.
112. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448. The Fitzpatrick Court quoted Ex parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339 (1880), where the Court there stated: "Congress is empowered to enforce,
and to enforce against state action, however put forth, whether that action be executive,
legislative, or judicial. Such enforcement is no invasion of state sovereignty." Fitzpat-
rick, 427 U.S. at 454.
113. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
114. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1124.
115. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 3. The Court stated: "Even if we never before had
discussed the specific connection between Congress' authority under the Commerce
Clause and states' immunity from suit, careful regard for precedent still would mandate
the conclusion that Congress has the power to abrogate immunity when exercising its
plenary authority to regulate commerce." Id. at 15.
116. Id. The Court in Union Gas reached a result without an express rationale
agreed upon by a majority of the court. Id. Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens
joined Justice Brennan, with Justice White providing the fifth vote for the result. Id. at
5, 45. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, O'Connor and Kennedy joined in dis-
sent. Id. at 45.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1980).
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monetary damages by private individuals against a state in fed-
eral court.
118
Union Gas operated a coal gasification plant that required
environmental cleanup by the Environmental Protection
Agency. 1 9 In conjunction with the state, the federal government
removed coal tar deposits left by Union Gas and reimbursed the
state for cleanup costs. 120 The federal government then sued
Union Gas to recoup its costs.121 In response, Union Gas filed a
third-party claim against the state alleging that the state was
partly responsible for the hazardous waste site.
22
After deciding that CERCLA was clearly intended to render
states liable for monetary damages, the Court considered
whether Congress possessed the same abrogation power under
the Interstate Commerce Clause as had been found to exist
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in Fitzpatrick.23
The Court determined that the states had indeed surrendered a
part of their sovereignty when they empowered Congress to regu-
late interstate commerce. 24 Analogizing Fitzpatrick, the Court
then reasoned that the same rationale employed in the Fitzpat-
rick decision was applicable to Union Gas, highlighting the fact
that both the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment expanded federal authority while contracting state
power. 1
25
The Union Gas Court distinguished Hans v. Louisiana126 on
the ground that Hans was brought to federal court under the
Judiciary Act of 1875; and that Act did no more than give effect
118. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5.
119. Id. The gasification plant produced coal tar deposits as a by-product. Id. After
the plant was dismantled, Pennsylvania attempted to install flood-control measures
along the creek where the plant had existed and struck coal tar deposits. Id. at 5. After
the deposits seeped into the creek, the Environmental Protection Agency declared the site
to be the Nation's first Emergency Superfund site. Id.
120. Id. at 6.
121. Id. The federal government claimed that the Union Gas Company was liable
as a depositor of the coal tar deposits. Id.
122. Id. The Union Gas Company alleged that Pennsylvania was liable for the
cleanup costs as an owner or operator of the hazardous-waste site, as well as because its
flood control efforts negligently caused the release of the deposits. Id.
123. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 7,14.
124. Id. at 14. The Court reasoned that states held liable under CERCLA were not
unconsenting; rather, they had given their consent all at once by ratifying a Constitution
that contained the Commerce Clause. Id. at 19.
125. Id. at 16-17. The Court stated, "Mike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Com-
merce Clause with one hand gives power to Congress, while, with the other, it takes
power away from the states. It cannot be relevant that the Fourteenth Amendment
accomplishes this exchange in two steps (§ § 1-4, plus § 5), while the Commerce Clause
does it in one." Id.
126. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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to the grant of federal question jurisdiction under Article 111.127
The Court reasoned that since Article III did not automatically
eliminate sovereign immunity as demonstrated by the required
passage of the Eleventh Amendment, neither did Article III's
enabling statute, the Judiciary Act of 1875.121 The Court rea-
soned, therefore, that Hans had not conclusively decided the
question of whether other congressional legislation could over-
ride states' immunity. Thus, the Court left open the question
whether Congress may abrogate state's immunity under powers
granted to it by the Constitution.129
As noted previously, the Seminole majority stated that
"[n]ever before the decision in Union Gas had [the Court] sug-
gested that the bounds of Article III jurisdiction could be
expanded by Congress operating pursuant to any constitutional
provision other than the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 0 The Semi-
nole majority further concluded that Union Gas was wrongly
decided and overruled the case as a result.
13 1
As Justice Stevens noted in a Seminole dissenting opinion,
"[t]he importance of the majority's decision to overrule the
Court's holding in Union Gas cannot be overstated." 32 The Sem-
inole decision will certainly have a tremendous impact on the
annual six billion dollar Indian gambling industry, as it effec-
tively means that because of the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity, Indian tribes cannot seek the assistance of federal
courts when a state fails to negotiate a compact in good faith or
at all. Notwithstanding this fact, however, the Seminole decision
may not be as harmful to tribes as it would initially appear.
The Seminole Court upheld the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals' dismissal of the Tribe's suit against Florida solely based
on the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition of proceedings against
unconsenting states.133 Elsewhere in the Eleventh Circuit's Sem-
inole decision, however, the Court interpreted the remaining pro-
visions of the IGRA as offering tribes a substitute remedy when
faced with recalcitrant states.' 34 After excising the IGRA's offen-
127. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19.
128. Id. The Court reasoned "[t]hat unsurprising conclusion does not begin to
address the question whether other congressional enactments, not designed to simply
implement Article III's grants of jurisdiction, may override state immunity." Id.
129. Id. at 17, 19.
130. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1127. The Court stated "it had seemed fundamental
that Congress could not expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the bounds of
Article III." Id.
131. Id. at 1128.
132. Id. at 1134 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1133.
134. 11 F.3d 1016, 1029 (C.A. 11 1994).
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sive provision, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded
that the surviving provisions of the IGRA allow immediate
recourse to the Secretary of Interior in the event of refusal by a
state to negotiate. 13 5 Should this scheme survive further judicial
review, tribes apparently would be free from an obligation to deal
with states regarding Indian gaming rights and would be
required to deal only with the Secretary of Interior, a potentially
more attractive alternative from the tribe's perspective.
13 6
The issue of Indian gaming regulation is important given the
proliferation of gaming facilities in recent years. Yet, as impor-
tant as this issue is, the real significance of the Seminole opinion
lies in the decision to disallow congressional abrogation of state
sovereign immunity pursuant to Article I powers.137 The holding
in Seminole is the third entry in a trilogy of cases continuing the
debate over defining the relationship of federal-state power
recently entered into by the Court in New York v. United
States' 8s and later in United States v. Lopez." 9 Like New York
and Lopez, Seminole was a case about power; and more specifi-
cally, about striking a balance between the federal government's
power to regulate and state autonomy.
Both New York and Lopez constrict congressional authority
while expanding state rights, which is the same result reached in
Seminole. Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in Seminole,
asserts that this constriction may have broad implications con-
cerning private parties' rights to seek redress in federal
forums. 14° The majority responded to this statement by expres-
135. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1129. Florida objected to this effort at compromise as
well, and filed a cross-petition (No. 94-219) appealing such modification of the IGRA's
remedial processes. Id. Further, the Supreme Court expressly declined to consider or
offer any opinion on that portion of the lower court's decision concerning the alternative
remedy of direct recourse to the Secretary of Interior. Id. at 1133.
136. Transcript, U.S.S.C.T. at p. 5. [1195 WL 606007]. This opinion was expressed
by Bruce Rogow, attorney for the Seminole Tribe, in response to questioning by Justice
Ginsburg during oral arguments. Id. It appears that if states fail to negotiate a compact
for Indian gaming rights, the Tribe's proposed compact will be the only compact submit-
ted to the Secretary of Interior. As put forth by Mr. Rogow, "[the states] will lose the
opportunity to participate in the scope of gaming .... " Id. at 9.
137. David G. Savage, States on a Winning Streak, A.B.A.J., June 1996, at 46.
138. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). In New York, the Court dealt with a state sovereignty
issue and held that Congress violated states' Tenth Amendment rights when it attempted
to commander the legislative processes of the states by directly compelling them to enact
and enforce federal regulatory programs. Id. at 175.
139. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). The Court in Lopez, dramatically shifting from previ-
ous jurisprudence, found that Congress had exceeded its authority under the Interstate
Commerce Clause in striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. Id.
140. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1134. Justice Stevens stated that the Seminole holding
not only prevents Congress from implementing the remedial scheme presented in the
IGRA, but may also "[p]reclude Congress from supplying a federal forum for a broad
range of actions against states, from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those
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sing that Justice Stevens' dire predictions are both "exaggerated
in substance and significance."14 ' The accuracy of the majority's
response to Justice Stevens will soon be tested, however, as the
reach of the Seminole holding has already begun to affect the
focus of litigation. 142 With the continued devolution of federal
power, as evidenced by the Seminole holding, litigants are show-
ing signs of willingness to press the Court for further expansion
of state power in the federalism equation.
One example of how the Seminole decision is impacting feder-
alism is exhibited by Blessing v. Freestone,43 a case in which Ari-
zona is attempting to defend a suit against the state on the basis
of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The court in
Blessing is confronted with the issue of whether the Eleventh
Amendment precludes private individuals from seeking redress
for alleged infractions regarding provisions of Title IV-D of the
Social Security Act.'" Congress enacted Title IV-D, known as
the Child Support Enforcement Act, to complement the federal
welfare program, Aid to Families With Dependant Children
("AFDC").145 Arizona is defending the case in part on the basis of
the Seminole holding.146 Arizona contends that the Eleventh
Amendment's guarantee of sovereign immunity, significantly
strengthened by the Seminole ruling, precludes an action insti-
tuted by private individuals.
147
Regardless of whether one agrees with Justice Stevens' assess-
ment of Seminole's future impact, or with the majority's conclu-
sion that the Seminole holding merely re-establishes the proper
balance in the federalism equation, it is apparent that the Semi-
nole decision has placed another arrow in the quiver of states'
concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation of our vast national econ-
omy." Id.
141. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1132. The majority enumerated ways in which parties
could still defend against a state's violation of federal law, including: the federal govern-
ment bringing suit against the offending state, an Exparte Young action by an individual
against a state officer and by judicial review of federal questions arising from state court
decisions where a state has consented to such suit. Id. at 1130. The Court concluded that
any corrective action on the Tribe's behalf, however, would have to be made by Congress
and not the courts. Id. at 1133.
142. Several cases are pending concerning state-funded universities' rights to
immunity from intellectual property claims. See e.g., College Savings Bank v. Florida
Pre-paid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 919 F.Supp. 756 (1996).
143. Freestone v. Cowan, 68 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub. nom.,
Blessing v. Freestone, 116 S. Ct. 1671 (U.S., May 13, 1996) (No. 95-1441).
144. Id.
145. S. 97, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1996).
146. Petitioner's Brief at 10, Blessing v. Freestone (No. 95-1441) (stating "[this case,
concerning whether Title IV-D can be enforced privately against state officials.., tests
the delicate balance of power ... between the federal government and the states").
147. Id. at 24.
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rights advocates. As Justice Stevens stated in his dissenting
opinion, it may be that Seminole will be regarded as no more
than advisory in character.' The potential protection afforded
states from suits by individuals, however, may prove too alluring
to ignore.
Philip W. Berezniak
148. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1145 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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